Valentine’s Day (2010)


1


Marxian Rating:




From Saint Valentine to Saint Paul...via Saint Fond!
by Gabriel Tupinambá

Multiple stories of Multiple Stories.

Akira Kurosawa’s Rashômon (1950), in which a hideous crime is recalled by different characters’ points of view, is probably one of the first films to be structured around different simultaneous stories. The development of this form was, of course, the same and only possible one when establishing any film form: it first started as an obscure formalist choice by an european/asian film maker, then it was brought to Hollywood, where it is made into a genre or a repeatable form, and then it became object of antagonism by new generations of non-Hollywood film makers.

This is also the very process of establishment of the film industry itself, since it was first a format for Germany's ambitious film productions, which was then imported together with their blockbuster film makers (Fritz Lang, Murneau, etc) and now we see how german and european film makers in general can only but relate themselves positive or negatively to what is arguably the only film School in the world.

Rashômon was composed of different versions of the same story, shown in slightly different ways, tainted by the position of each character through which it was filtered. This splitting into different perspectives of the same event would then lead to the more complex structure of films which narrate different stories revolving around one event or common background. To speak of current film productions, we could say that Iñarratu’s Babel (2006) is probably the greatest example of this, though Robert Altman was a master of the multiple-story structure, and many other films work in similar ways. Michael Haneke’s Code Inconnu (2000) is very much an answer to this same structure.

Though normally films structured in the ‘various perspectives’ format use it to argue for or against the place of contingency in society (Babel: we are all connected but we don’t know it; Magnolia and Altman’s Short Cuts: one strange moment can change all of our lives; Code Inconnu: social life as a whole cannot be accounted for;) in Valentine’s Day (2010) it serves the much more direct function of playing out possible different contend for the same form. Its almost the obverse of Rashômon: it is not that the different point of views show the same content, but distorted. Here the content is different (different people, different ages, etc) but the outcome is always the same (finding true love).

But the film that can help us understand this particular presentation of the multiple-lines structure is actually David Lynch’s Mulholland Drive (2001) which also - but not only -switches between fragments of story when one sequence finds some sort of deadlock, moving on to the following, apparently disconnected one.

This seems to be the key to read Valentine’s Day beyond its apparently diverse portrayal of relationships.

Love as Event, Love as Fidelity.

Most Hollywoodian films about love could be divided into two (badiouian) categories:

- Films about Love as Event: films in which the narrative revolves around the encounter of two lovers and the difficulties leading to that encounter.

- Films about Love as Fidelity: films in which the narrative is based on the conflicts and problems of maintaining a relationship.

The examples of both are abundant - as well as of films which try to break with this division, only to use one of the two modes to undo the other. For example, the recent rom-com, (500) Days of Summer (2009) shows a couple falling in love and staying together for some time, but the way they break up shows us that the Event was never an event in the first place, it wasn’t “meant to be”. Another example is Eternal Sunshine of The Spotless Mind (2004), in which a disastrous relationship is re-done all over again to justify how special it was that they found each other.

But why can’t both elements fit into the same narrative? Valentine’s Day helps us to understand this problem.

Lynch as a critic of ideology

Firstly, let us quickly sketch the intertwined stories the film narrates:

1. Morley leaves Reed because she doesn’t want to commit to marriage, he then falls in love with his best friend, Julia.
2. Julia breaks up with her cheating boyfriend Copeland, and falls in love with Reed.
3. Kara hates Valentine’s, like Kelvin, both single, and this brings them together.
4. Jason is dating Liz, but he finds out she has secrets. They re-state their desire to be together accepting each other’s faults.
5. Edgar finds out that Estelle cheated on him many years ago. But he forgives her.
6. Holden goes back to his boyfriend Sean, who just declared on tv to be gay.
7. Captain Kate comes back from duty to visit her son Edison.
8. Edison thinks he loves his teacher, Julia, but he falls in love for his classmate, Rani.
9. Grace wants to have sex with Alex to save their relationship, but they decide to wait.

We also have a couple of stories which are just mentioned in the film - like Alphonso’s successful marriage, that serves as a background for the Reed-Julia encounter (Alphonso tells Reed that he “married his best friend” and so Reed ‘understands’ that he actually loves Julia), or Felicia and her boyfriend Willy, who serve as the teenage lust comparison for Grace and Alex’s difficulties in keeping their relationship together.

Most stories intrude one another, but not in a narrative sense, they don’t influence each other, just share characters, which play secondary roles in one while being the main reference in another. The sketch above doesn’t describe all the different connections and, what is even more important, it doesn’t show at all when we change from one story to another.

In his book on David Lynch, The Ridiculous Sublime, Žižek talks about Lynch’s mastery of juxtaposing two opposing fantasies in the same story line and then working out the passage from one to the other. Žižek also mentions how the tension of this juxtaposition forces the film into a fragmentation of the content when a sequence gets too close to the impossibility of its own fantasy - that’s when we need to break out of it. The greatest examples of this are surely the main shifts, around the middle of the films, that happen both in Mulholland Drive (2001) and Lost Highway (1997), in which the very identity of the main characters are changed by the abrupt cut from one scenario to the other.

If we apply the two categories of love fantasies in Hollywood to Valentine’s Day we get an almost even split between the two: 1+2+3+8 are love stories based on the encounter and 4+5+6+9 are fidelity love stories (we will leave Julia Roberts’ 7 out, since we only counted it as a story in the first place because Julia Roberts is in it.). So we basically get two fantasies which never actually mix, being shot in the same film. We could say that, in a way, Valentine’s Day is practically structured like a lynchian film. But what is the difference? Why does Lynch’s film create anguish and this romantic comedy create warm, fuzzy feelings?

We can easily find an answer to this when we have Lynch in mind while watching the rom-com: While Lynch’s work revolves around going too far within a certain fantasy - and breaking up with it out of the impossibility of holding on to a certain reality (just remember the beautiful scene at Winky’s, in Mulholland Drive : isn’t it the definition of going too far?) - Valentine’s Day avoids staying too long with any story, so that we never see where its impossibility lies. But what could be this impossibility?

The ‘divide and conquer’ structure.

Here, let us just quote a brilliant passage of Žižek’s text on Avatar (2010), in which he questions how far the fantasy of the film could extend itself:

This is why it is interesting to imagine a sequel to Avatar in which, after a couple of years (or, rather, months) of bliss, the hero starts to feel a weird discontent and to miss the corrupted human universe. The source of this discontent is not only that every reality, no matter how perfect it is, sooner or later disappoints us. Such a perfect fantasy disappoints us precisely because of its perfection: what this perfection signals is that it holds no place for us, the subjects who imagine it.” (Žižek, Return of the Natives)

This is the very precise point we needed to make: If the film went further with the development of each story, we would necessarily have to encounter a place where the very narrative would break down. The re-inscription of the first encounter - which always ‘feels so right’ and is so natural - would by definition have to undermine the very aspects that made it an encounter in the first place. Predicates like ‘natural’ and ‘right’ cannot hold through the day after. Something else would have to be the basis of the encounter.

Love as pure Event (which is also the structure of Avatar) relies on fidelity being a necessity so that the very fact that the encounter happened will automatically sustain it for good. The characters in Avatar will be together forever - why? Because they met each other.

And the same goes for the other way around. In Love as pure Fidelity, the event is almost a transcendental guarantee of its consequences: will the couple in Date Night (2010) survive their marital conflicts? Yes, because they have each other.

So, in Valentine’s Day, the different stories are organized so that we do not get a chance to see the place where each one of the two main fantasies fails. Every time one of the sequences could raise any sort of issue with its own formula - when the question of fidelity could be raised in relation to the encounter, or vice versa - we get a cut, and a new scene, which deals with the impossibility, but from the perspective of the other fantasy, where the first point is not an issue at all.

Its like cutting from Avatar to Couple’s Retreat (2009) to develop the consequences of the film’s recently created couple. Something is lost in this transition! We should also ask ourselves why it is that this same double-structure of Event and Fidelity can work differently in, for example, end-of-the-world scenarios - There doesn’t seem to be an impossibility of getting together Armageddon (1998) and The Day After Tomorrow (2004).

Maybe the problem is with themes which rely on the subject and cannot be called ‘natural disasters’ - like Love, Politics, Science and Art, for example...

One...Three...Two?

What if Hollywood produced a romantic comedy which moved beyond this dualism, this logic which is always based on the ‘other’ pole becoming either a natural or a transcendental certainty?

We already know the traumatic point is somewhere in between they met and they have each other, in the way we go from the first to the second, or that we present the second so that the first can still be a cause and not an excuse. It is as if Hollywood could count to ‘three’ only by skipping ‘two’.

In the Love as pure Encounter movies we have the journey into becoming One.

(We could add another badiouian twist here, which proves our point even further, by pointing out that most romantic comedies of this kind also include what Badiou calls the ‘missed encounter’, the first - necessarily failed - attempt of the Event. This is a formal part of the rom-com structure: Every time the main character decides to finally declare his/her love, something happens and - normally by accident - she/he thinks the other is not interested anymore. This is always the final test before the couple can be created.)

The journey of the characters is always of recognizing one in the other and finding common ground to be together. From the “you complete me” slogan all the way to the pseudo-buddhist endings of total union through acceptance, the main force is unity - and the will of finding the other with whom s/he can make One with.

This of course relies on the disavowal of the disjunctions of sexuation - simplifying it extremely: man needs to overcome his neurotic obsessive symptoms or the woman has to move beyond her hysteric symptoms, or the other way around. We can exemplify this perfectly with As Good as It Gets (1997), in which facing the anguish of his symptoms is the very condition for Jack Nicholson’s character to find love. The sexual difference needs to be made unproblematic, so it can be inscribed into the whole of the couple.

In the Love as pure Fidelity version we get the journey of Two... plus One: the passed Event which now guarantees the validity of the couple. The memory of the event hangs like a shadow above the lovers, guaranteeing in their place that they should be together. Many films with this triangular structure actually work around the formation of a love triangle, so that the event can be tested in the flesh of a third figure - normally the strongest link of the Three.

But what about the Two? Why does Hollywood need to elevate either the event or the fidelity into an Absolute in-itself? Surely people fall in love in Hollywood as well, so what is the problem when turning it into a film, why can’t love happen without some sort of transcendental support inscribed into it, distorting its very notion?

In the freudian theory of repression, the representations that cannot appear in consciousness do not simply vanish, but appear as a mere ‘something else’, rather than the invested set of signifiers they actually are - otherwise, the void left in their place would simply make even more apparent their importance.

And if we look for Love as Two in Hollywood we do find it, as one of two situations: either as the relationship between the main character and someone else, normally at the beginning of rom-coms (the boring guy she will leave for the real love of her life) which is portrayed in such a way that being together ‘for no reason’ is the very reason to leave the relationship for something new. Normally the justification for the break-up is that ‘something is not right’ - but... when you have no guarantee of completion (One), or of a third, guaranteeing agency (Three)... isn’t this just a way of stating that it could be love?

Love as Two has also been appearing with more constancy in films which are worried with showing man and woman’s independence from each other. In order to accomplish this, a relationship should be the juxtaposition of two Ones (thus doubling the fantasy of ‘being complete’). A great recent example of this is The Back-up Plan (2010), in which the title already says pretty much it all.

In a way, we can get the structure of love as event and fidelity to the event only if there is no love, no truth. We could probably guess that the ‘democratic materialism’ of the cinema discourse will invest more and more in these film productions, which are the best example of its own premisses: it is “humane”, it has no “false expectations”, and it states clearly that there are only bodies (of the event) and languages (of fidelity), but no truth (to raise both parts of the structure into a transformative subjective position).

This version of Love as Two is the very definition of Love as Betrayal. All the elements of Love as Two can be included in the narrative, provided that one either turns away from it, or betrays its very structure. You can either turn Two into One+One (two complete individuals who don’t need each other) or into Three minus One (minus One = the boring boyfriend!).

This betrayal, showing Hollywood’s perverse ‘I know very well, but...’ points towards the thesis that it is Truth, as the definite dimension of Love, which needs to be forcluded (excluded in its inclusion).

Dongria Kondh

And at this precise moment we should pause and go back to Žižek’s critique of Avatar:

“At the same time as Avatar is making money all around the world (it generated $1bn after less than three weeks of release), something that strangely resembles its plot is taking place. The southern hills of the Indian state of Orissa, inhabited by the Dongria Kondh people, were sold to mining companies that plan to exploit their immense reserves of bauxite (the deposits are considered to be worth at least $4trn). In reaction to this project, a Maoist (Naxalite) armed rebellion exploded.
(...)
The Indian prime minister characterized this rebellion as the "single largest internal security threat"; the big media, which present it as extremist resistance to progress, are full of stories about "red terrorism", replacing stories about "Islamist terrorism". No wonder the Indian state is responding with a big military operation against "Maoist strongholds" in the jungles of central India. And it is true that both sides are resorting to great violence in this brutal war, that the "people's justice" of the Maoists is harsh. However, no matter how unpalatable this violence is to our liberal taste, we have no right to condemn it. Why? Because their situation is precisely that of Hegel's rabble: the Naxalite rebels in India are starving tribal people, to whom the minimum of a dignified life is denied.

So where is Cameron's film here? Nowhere: in Orissa, there are no noble princesses waiting for white heroes to seduce them and help their people, just the Maoists organising the starving farmers.”
(Žižek, Return of the Natives)

Avatar can make the problem clearer to us, because it develops at the same time the love encounter as well as the political event. Žižek’s argument in the first extract we quoted was that the film had to end where it did so that the love encounter could remain beyond its own decadence (which would surely come a week later, when the guy found out there was no tv there), and now the philosopher reminds us that this same beyond of the love encounter, created by the non-development of its aftermath, is also the force behind the political commitment of the main character. When he compares “Pandora” with Orissa, we see that something other than ‘it feels right’ and ‘it is natural’ would have to take place in order to support a true political stance.

What we get both in the political and amorous discourse in Hollywood is that the price to pay for their appearance is that it is reduced just to that. Love without lovers - a attentive glance at any of the characters in rom-coms and it becomes clear that so little is at stake, so little risk, that there are lovers because the film is about love, not the other way around. And Politics without committed subjects - after all, how can someone be committed to an Idea if the Idea doesn’t need one’s commitment, but actually pushing the subject towards a political engagement? It’s inverted, again.

So, couldn’t we say that the very structure which could not be narrated in Valentine’s Day is homologous to that of true political commitment - or any other commitment which comes from Nothing and exists solely through the fidelity of its subjects to its cause? Because for true love, as well as for true political commitment, no natural or transcendental cause or effect can have the role of guarantee. We can only truly love from the position of the Dongria Kondh.

In granting us with the depiction of Love as Two, Hollywood would be helping to disseminate the very tools that would lead to its demise.

Earthlings (2007)


7


Marxian Rating:




The piety of the righteous

By Martín López

Earthlings (2007) is a documentary about animal suffering, known as the “vegan maker” around the world. It is basically structured as a series of footages of cruelty to animals solemnly narrated by Joaquin Phoenix and anodically set to the music of Moby. The main theme is speciesism, a fashionable term to describe a form of essentialism by which animals are discriminated by humans.

The documentary begins with an Arthur Schopenhauer quote (although the source is not properly cited) describing the three stages of a truth:

  1. Ridiculization
  2. Violent opposition
  3. Acceptance

There are three things we can say about this phenomenology of truth: First, there are ridiculous interpretations of the world that are not necessarily true (they rather have an "effect of truth"). Also, in the same way, some unfair situations deserve to be violently opposed. Finally, many fallacies and injustices are generally accepted, which does not make them true. When we are really facing a truth, it's not a matter of whether or not we can allocate a place for it, but a question of how can we place ourselves in it. So what kind of truths are we dealing with here? Does the truth revealed in this documentary demand for a different subjective position or it is easily assimilated into our world?

Anti-speciesists claim that we humans should not make moral distinctions between humans and… non-humans. But how far can we go this way? Sexism, racism, and ageism are different forms of discrimination among humans. If you claim equality as a principle you cannot elaborate -at the same time- an ethical edifice based on differences. If men are no different than women in the eyes of justice, it is because men and women share a common condition (i.e. humanity). So what is the common condition that makes humans and animals subjects of ethics? Being mere forms of life? Is that what this is all about?

If our ethical horizon will be defined in terms of biological features, let’s start from the beginning. A Species is a category or rank in the biological taxonomy. This is the basic hierarchy:

Life > Domain > Kingdom > Phylum > Class > Order > Family > Genus > Species

The first thing we need to know is how far we are willing to go in our ethical stance. Here’s the first problem: Considering other forms of life as subjects of ethics does not expand ethics. On the contrary, it reduces ethics to pure natural selection. The more we escalate this taxonomy the more we fall into a mystification of nature. Ethics lose their ground: they are no longer decisions made by subjects sharing a common condition. They become laws of nature. The only possible ethical act is therefore obeying the laws of nature.

We know there's no final cause in nature. What we call nature is an essentially chaotic and violent process, with no ultimate goal; no bigger plan that we all are part of. This reminds us a Spinoza quote on the traditional dicta that God or nature does nothing in vain, that God does everything for the best that there are no gaps in nature:

But in seeking to show that Nature does nothing in vain, that is, nothing that is not to man's advantage, they seem to have shown only this, that Nature and the gods are as crazy as mankind. (Ethics P1, Appendix).

This mystification is consistent with scientistic discourses according to which nature has a personality, and a purpose. We should not be surprised when biologists like Richard Dawkins compare speciesism with human slavery:

What I am doing is going along with the fact that I live in a society where meat eating is accepted as the norm, and it requires a level of social courage which I haven't yet produced to break out of that. It's a little bit like the position which many people would have held a couple of hundred years ago over slavery.

As you can see in the dialog between two characters in Notting Hill (1999), Cinema takes a step further on this:

William: And, ahm: what exactly is a fruitarian?

Keziah: We believe that fruits and vegetables have feeling so we think cooking is cruel. We only eat things that have actually fallen off a tree or bush - that are, in fact, dead already.

William: Right. Right. Interesting stuff. So, these carrots...

Keziah: Have been murdered, yes.

William: Murdered? Poor carrots. How beastly!

So the truth of anti-speciesism -and with it, its whole ethical structure- appears to be the equalization of human rights and animal rights. Isn’t this a little bit arbitrary? Here’s the second problem: What consequences can we expect from this? In any case the empathy for other species does not require political activism. Following the same logic we should ask ourselves if we are not forgetting the cruelty to other forms of life outside the kingdom Animalia, such as plants, and fungi. Right after anti-speciesism we should fight against genusism, then familism, and so on. Being anti-speciesists does not safeguard us from being genusists or domainists. What is the limit here? By following this same path we will end up talking about mineral rights.


Where in earth is justice?

Is life the boundary of ethics? If this is the case, if life as such is the common ground for our ethical edifice, the only condition to threat any living being as equal could be dwelling the same planet. At least that is what is implied in the commercial motto: “We are earthlings, make the connection”. Then let’s take this a step further: If being an earthling is the basis of the egalitarian principle…. Why discriminate against extra-terrestrial forms of life? Those poor little aliens… It was just a matter of time until they released the documentary-style film District 9 (2009), showing the inhuman conditions of extra-terrestrial slum dwellers.

But who are the victims? How are they identified? Do they present themselves as victims? We can differentiate natural and artificial victims, produced by men. The incumbency of anti-speciesism is therefore very limited: preventing animal cruelty in conditions of artificiality. However, only humans can make this "connection", only humans can conceive the artificiality of violence and avoid it. Then anti-speciesism can be, at best, a protocol to avoid unnecessary abuses to other forms of life.

Then what does anti-speciesism really account for? Is it an extreme form of anthropocentrism that identifies men with animals from the perspective of humanity? If this is the case, human rights should be extended to all species of animals, and the only price we have to pay is the humanization of animals (considering other forms of life like genera, families, orders, etc. as inferior… for now). Or is anti-speciesism another theological way of denying subjectivity? Then we are dealing with another Zen mystification of nature. We’re not humanizing animals, but animalizing humans. Humans are fully identified with their bodies, with their animality.

This is ultimately true: Humans are animals. Humans are mortal creatures, predators. But this is not what singularizes the human animal in the world of the living. If humans are “somebody” instead of “something” then the anti-speciesist concept of animals should consider them “somebody” as well. The thing is “somebody” and “something” are human distinctions. Animals cannot tell the difference, or if they can, we cannot tell if they tell. We are stuck here. According to anti-speciesists, we humans and animals have the same rights and therefore we should share a common conception of justice. But what kind of justice does not allow us to transmit what is just or unjust to our congeners? What notion of justice is that where the ultimate goal is to prevent the suffering of the victims? Far from questioning the ideological matrix that shaped the proclamation of the Rights of Man (i.e. the idea of justice as the piety of the righteous) we are expanding it out of its boundaries.

Think of it: The very delimitation of this ethical quagmire is derived from power relationships, which, again, are specifically human. Ethical principles are human inventions; they are not the result of a survival strategy. Anti-speciesism is based on a trivialization of the principle of equality. The declaration of the animal “bill or rights” was not signed by animals… that we know of.


Biopolitics at its purest

There’s a part in the documentary where Joaquin Phoenix says animals understand the world in which they live (the same way humans do), because if they couldn’t, they would not survive. We reached the ideological core of the anti-speciesist stance: What constitutes its “ethics” (its “truth effect”) is the proclamation that we all (living beings in this planet) have the right to survive, the right to avoid suffering and death. The ultimate goal is survival; we have nothing but our instinct of self-preservation. As a consequence of this, the documentary has a rapt gaze on the Nazi Holocaust as the greatest of all imaginable Evils. Since human existence is a form of life among others, we are told that humans are “not equal, nor inferior, but other nations”. Yes, you heard right: Animals are considered nations. So anti-speciesists want to be the UN consuls among animal nations. They want to establish a new perpetual peace among species. Too bad there will be only human representatives. Maybe that is why they have chosen Joaquin Phoenix as the narrator. His hare lips remind us the connection with animality.

According to the protectors of life in earth, having certain rights makes us subjects of ethics: the right to survive, the right not to feel pain. This is a by definition a conservative vision: the main purpose is to preserve the Status Quo of life. Life is something precious and fragile that needs to be protected. Ethics are reduced to bio-ethics. But, again, why not fungi? Why not plants or other forms of life outside Animalia? The focus on the suffering of the victims says it all: anti-speciesists protect potentially conscious ways of life, living beings that have the ability to feel pain. In the eyes of this conception of justice, we are just suffering creatures that need to be protected. The preservation of life is the ultimate ethical act. Pain must be avoided at all costs. It is OK if everything remains the same, as long as pain is kept to a minimum. So animals are either considered “pain receptors” (defenseless creatures at the mercy of the great master, the homo sapiens), or “nations”, fully conscious living beings, with a history of their own, whose natural rights should be upheld according to the universal principles of nature. And what do these two ideas have in common? Aren't they both two sides of the same coin?

When the euthanasia theme is discussed in the documentary, lethal injection is presented as the more "human" method for sacrificing animals. They say human culture must learn to feel outside of itself. We humans should learn empathy. The empathy we have between humans should be not different that the empathy we have to other forms of life (at least in this planet). But this is nothing new. Don't the “Help Animals” and “Help Africa” commercials share the demand that we should demonstrate the same empathy for a hungry stray dog than for hungry children?

We can't really "take into consideration the interests of animals". How could we? Are we aware of those interests? Do animals have interests? The only thing we can do is set priorities and act according to principles. Protecting life above all things is quite an arbitrary principle, presented as something rational and benevolent. Why is the homo sapiens the only privileged creature that knows the difference between right and wrong? All this humanitarian chatter is just the reverse side of the silence imposed to the victims (our own human victims). Naming ourselves (human beings) the protectors of all forms of life in this planet (in the image and likeness of us) accounts for a reactionary idea of justice: That is, a justice that comes from outside of us; whose voice can be heard only by the righteous. A justice imparted to bodies without Idea: living beings that need to be protected in their essence: bodies that eat, suffer, and die; fragile creatures who desperate plea for shelter.

We are later told that killing animals for food is a unilateral decision. Maybe they forgot to mention than breeding and reproducing animals are unilateral decisions as well. It's actually part of the modernization of man, the creation of human culture. So then what are these statements aiming to? Going back to idealized communities where animals are killed in religious rituals as in James Cameron's Avatar (2009)? This is how the spiritual path begins: the return to the lost paradise, the return to a transcendental balance, to a past that never really existed. All origin myth is nothing but a mystification of ideological underpinnings.

But cheer up, anti-speciesists! Here' the “good news”: Animals are not actually getting the worst part of it: Millions of human beings are already being treated as captive animals. The majority of world population are living in slums, rural settlements, displaced areas and refugee camps. Thousands of people die of hunger for each whale that is killed. The EU annual subsides for each cow are greater than the GDP per capita in many African countries. And this is just a start.

The actual finality of this ideology is justifying the stratification of man and other life forms excluding certain parts of the definition of man. Those man who are not fully identified with their human “essence” are already being treated as cattle, at the mercy of the market (a.k.a. “the nature”) to exploit them, cast away from humanity and considered inhumane and dangerous. This conception of all men as equals has its reverse: If you are not equal, you are not a man. In the same way, anti-speciesists might say that all living beings are equal, but... if you are not equal, you are not even alive. Finally, we will reach the ontological zero level of the definitive “bill of rights”: All that exists is equal, and if you are not equal, you don't exist.

Ideology cannot but escape always in the same direction: forwards. Just look at the movie poster. The harmonic trilogy Humankind - Animals - Nature is just a reverse side of a more dangerous trinity: Homo Sacer - “Living Being” Sacer - “Entity” Sacer. We're entering the second stage now. The life preservation nihilism is nothing but contempt for life, a deeply symptomatic will of nothingness, or, in Freudian terms, a death drive. The ultimate (unconscious?) goal for anti-speciesists is to safely keep all forms of life in this planet in a conservation area, which is nothing different than what’s already happening... humans included.

Robin Hood (2010)


2

Marxian Rating:



Robbing Hood

By Gabriel Tupinambá

In 2010 Brazil will hold presidential elections. After Lula’s two mandates, PT is trying to continue in power through the candidature of Dilma Rousseff. While we all wait for the official campaigns to start, the two main candidates do their best to turn construction sites and syndicate meetings into their own unofficial candidature platforms - newspapers and the media in general are also helping out, of course.

But around all the in-between-the-lines discussions between pre-candidates, one particular event seemed to spring to the foreground and take the limelight, just before the actual pre-candidatures began. It was the film about Lula’s life, Lula, the Son of Brazil (2009) which was released on the 1st of January.

Though no doubt an important film - which had to be made at some point - the film’s release date and the fact that it was financed with private funds (clearly showing a concern with dispelling the suspicion that it could be a piece of publicity for the PT) tend to show that the movie had very much a purpose to serve within Brazil’s political scenery.

All of that is fine. The more clear the film’s purpose, the more political use - for worse but also for good - it can have. But the attempt to cover up its possible relation to the PT was shown not only in the manner the film was promoted, but also in the content of the film. It is also known that the film was adapted from an authorized biography and that the producers of the film met with the president to get his consent. So the film’s position is in some ways supported by the image the government wants to display of its leader.

The film’s director, Fábio Barreto, answered the questions of what was his political position, and of how did it influence the movie, by saying that he just wanted to show “Lula, the man”, the human being. He justified it by saying that because he wanted to show the human side of Lula, he chose to tell the story only from his childhood to his syndicalist years - and not adventure into the PT formation or anything after that.

The “humanization” discourse quickly finds its purpose if one attentively watches the film.

Lula, the human being, is a man who speaks to his fellow workers not of revolution and overthrowing power, but of working together with the factory businessman to create a better future. Lula, the man behind the legend, is a caring husband, who preaches about better work conditions for the working class, but in no way comes close to touching the “abstract” worries of changing how the actual system works.

It was with some surprise - for the unaware, at least - that the brazilians realized that Lula’s government was turning out to be much more conservative than PT's previous government programs could imply. Setting aside the many reasons for this adjustment of political posture, the fact is that a certain discourse had to be reviewed now that Lula occupied a new position in Brazil’s political panorama.

What Lula, the Son of Brazil tried to accomplish is exactly that: to re-inscribe back into Lula’s history how he had always been the neo-liberal president he turned out to be. This is what is called ‘humanization’ in the arts: To immerse the character so deeply in the capitalist ideology that his story in the world is no longer the site of the struggle of the Idea, but could only have it as the natural background over which the story develops, confusing the capitalist premisses with the very core of humanity.

Robin Hood didn’t run for prime minister in Britain’s recent elections, but this only serves to emphasize that Ridley Scott’s film contributes to a much broader type of propaganda.

Robin Hood (2010) was actually supposed to be called ‘Nottingham’, because the original script was deeply focused on Robin Hood the man, not the legend - actually, he was so human that he wasn’t even the main character of the film, the Sheriff was! There was such a focus on humanizing him that the studios realized that people wouldn’t probably know the film was about Robin Hood if that wasn’t spelled out in the title. So they went back to the ‘legendary’ name.

The film starts while Robin Longstride is still a faithful soldier of King Richard the Lionheart - “honest and brave...and naive”, in the words of the King - then, after he tells the King that his Crusades are corrupted, promoting the massacre of uncountable innocent lives, the King dies in battle and Robin flees back to England.

In the meantime, the French plan an ambush to murder the (already dead) King, killing other english soldiers instead. Amongst their possessions was the british crown, which was on its way back to England. Robin and a couple of other renegade soldiers, who witnessed the ambush, manage to steal the crown back and return to England under the pretense of being the actual soldiers supposed to bring the crown.

Under a false name, Robin ends up in Nottingham, meeting the (now ex-)wife and father of the man whose name he is using as an alias. He is there fulfilling a promise he made to the dying man, of returning his sword to his father. The father, Sir Walter Loxley, is an old, blind and slightly demented land Lord. His land is extremely poor and he doesn’t have the money to pay his taxes. In the role of the strong minded hysteric who does the job the men are not capable of, is Cate Blanchett’s character, Marion, his daughter.

After the ‘Lionheart’ King, the figure of the brave King, we get this second figure of the Master, the old and blind man - a ridiculous obverse to King Richard, who was so full of life and ambition that his mere appearance as a tired aging man could only come minutes before he was killed in battle. This second King, on the other hand, is pure decadence.

Robin is invited to stay with the Loxleys under the disguise of being Sir Walter’s son (and Marion’s husband), to help them avoiding higher taxing from the government. Until here, we are within traditional legendary tales of Hollywood - we get the idealized version of the hero, with just some ‘grittier’ complements, to make “the movie experience” more exciting.

The third figure of the King, the recently promoted Prince John, is maybe the most interesting: being the villain - the arrogant, false and immature man who unbalances the plot - he is so full of defects that he becomes almost too human for a humanized character. But this is not apparent in the film, since all he needs to do is to incite Robin Longstride to correct the mistakes that he is about to make.

So this third caricatural King demands that more and more money be collected from the poor. The second King, dying and very poor himself, cannot obey the majesties’ request - and it is left for Robin to do something about it, in the name of the first King, who died as to become a beacon of honor and decency.

The main twist of the film comes right at this junction. After learning of the terrible situation of the men living in Sir Loxley’s land (and also after flirting enough with his daughter to suppose that what she wants is a noble and courageous lover) Robin decides to steal back from the church the grains that they have been collecting from the workers in the name of God. He ambushes the church helpers in the middle of the night, takes the grain back and uses it to seed the lifeless ground of the village. It all seemed like the known story of Robin Wood...

...But the morning after, when he sits down for breakfast with sir Loxley, under the loving eyes of Marion (Cate Blanchett’s not so loving eyes), the dying father confesses to him that he knew Robin’s father.

He then goes on to tell the story of how Robin had been brought up by his father who was already fighting for the poor. The sword he had promised to bring back to sir Loxley, for example, beard some engravings that spelled “Rise and rise again, until lamb become lions”. Robin thought he recognized those words, but only when sir Loxley tells the story of his childhood can he then remember that his father was the one who wrote them first, on a big stone by their village’s main monument.

Not only that, his father also had more ambitious political ideas, so he wrote down as some sort of bill of rights (which coincidentally, sir Loxley has in his possession!), stating the basic rights that all free men should have. Like the right of private property, for example.

Abruptly, the film develops a much broader scope, and we find ourselves in the midst of a battle between England and France. The French had been charging even higher taxes from the british farmers, disguised as english troops, trying to revolt the people against the King. The new and unpopular King was having a hard time controlling the masses and France wanted to use this fragility as an advantage in battle.

Who comes then, holding in his hand a document that could unite all the land in the name of fairness of exchange and property rights? Robin Longstride.

Actually, in the film he is called ‘Robin Hood’ only once or twice, but actually as ‘the so called Robin from the Hood’ (was this the filmmakers’ attempt to make the character more identifiable for the people living in the Bronx or is it just me?)

From the Lionheart King - the very image (though we don’t actually see it) of the Master that is alive and breathing, whose life is not only the life of the master, but the mastery of life - then to the dying King - still noble and good, but unable to sustain himself in the rising of this new world - and finally to the yuppie King John, who cannot be taken as a solid figure of identification, an arrogant man who does not care for his people. It is this figure that finally opens the space for the act of Robin, who offers something everyone can identify to instead.

After King John promises to make effective the document that Robin brought, everyone goes to war and defeat the French. After the war, of course, King John takes his word back, burns the document and curses Robin, calling him a traitor. But the damage is done. The King had to renounce the document, so that it could be implemented independently from the visible figure of the master.

Robin ‘from the Hood’ will now continue - after all, he didn’t know it, but he had always been - fighting for the rights of every man to be his own little master. It goes without saying that someone else will have to play the little slave, but this is not Robin Longstride’s concern.

Let us rejoice over this short dialog that exemplifies really well the position of our hero - this is the catch phrase that turns all the film around, uniting all the people before the war:

“Prince John: [sarcastically] Would every man have a castle?
Robin Longstride: In England, every man's home is his castle.”


Notice how this can be read in two ways: it could mean that a man has all he needs in his small share of land, that a man treated with respect will not extend his ambitious beyond the realm of what he needs - or it can mean that every man has the right to treat his little share of land with the same ruthless exploiting methods that the feudal castle previously detained only for itself.

Robin Hood was supposed (by us, at least) to give back to the poor what already belonged to them, but this incarnation of the hero - not the legend, but the human being - actually gives to the poor that which belonged to the rich in the most radical sense: the universalized Idea of usury! In the same way that his ‘every man’s home is his castle’ slogan brings some very dark overtones, doesn’t the same apply for ‘until lambs become lions’?

And all this politically charged developments are done in the name of a natural background, something which had always been there, and so tangled up with the notion of humanity itself, that Robin’s path into accepting his father’s heritage is confused with the acceptance and universalization of the capitalist principles.

In 2009, Alain Badiou published a book called The meaning of Sarkozy, about what it meant to elect Nicolas Sarkozy as the new president of France. After wards, in an interview, Sarkozy accused Badiou of not being a humanist. Badiou, as a good student of Althusser’s anti-humanism, answered brilliantly by saying that of course he was not a humanist - he had no idea of what a criteria for humanity could be - but he knew of a certain discourse which was very much based on a criteria for what a man is (and is not.): fascism.

What Badiou’s answer reminds us of, is that the humanization of an otherwise legendary character does not serve the purpose of unveiling how he ‘actually is/was’, with his faults and imperfections. Inscribed in the choice of what imperfections should be portrayed in the film is a very particular choice of what is universal to man. This way, under the pretense of ‘showing man as he is’, one naturalizes the criteria of what is a man in the first place. And the more ‘natural’ it is, the more ‘righteous’ it is to equate giving people dignity and a propriety, for example.

Hegel repeatedly - and enthusiastically - emphasized to us throughout his oeuvre how the Spirit is not beyond the world, like a God overseeing the world from a far, but goes through its different stages in its appearance in the world. What this means is that changes to the application of ideas are changes in the Idea itself - if a man is fighting for a new mode of organizing society, he is not doing so against the background of an immutable Idea of society, he is struggling with the actual Idea. A real change in the world is a break so deep within the realm of the Idea, that one can’t even think about the concept in the same way. (To make this point clear, please refer to this brilliant explanation by Zizek)

This is the true reason behind apparently ‘flat’ characters - they are not legendary and flawless because we idealize them, but because they bring the Idea to the world, and re-invent it in its own ground. They do not rise, they bring the Idea down to appearance. Why would we have an use for such characters, if not because of this? There is no (apparent) use for flawed, psychologically justified characters besides justifying the very Idea through which they are defined as flawed. This is the true way of idealizing a character, of rising him to the level of an immutable Idea or God, which is ‘naturally’ above us, waiting for our acceptance of its inevitability.

Here we can remember Bertold Brecht, who showed us how radical concern with the structure of social relations and the flatness of men reduced to their “smallest greatness” can coincide in dramatic representations: To show a man how he really is, is to show him as totally artificial and let him construct through his work his own essence.

Focusing again on Robin Hood, we can see that the reference to Hegel is very fruitful, because the same process we see happening with Robin happens to the passage of Spirit in english society as a whole. It is not only Robin who accepts who he was all along, but the line of the three Kings - the Brave, the Blind and the Wall Street’s Charlie Sheen - follows a movement which answers to the same structure.

In this film, the passage from feudalism to capitalism is justified by the simple removal of identification with the King: we fully identify with the first, with the man and with the function, then we can only identify with the function in the second one, then we can’t identify with any of it in the third one. And then the new law can be implemented as if by no authority.

On the passage from feudalism to capitalism, Zizek writes:

“The passage from feudalism to Protestantism is not of the same nature as the passage from Protestantism to bourgeois everyday life with its privatized religion. The first passage concerns "content" (under the guise of preserving the religious form or even its strengthening, the crucial shift - the assertion of the ascetic acquisitive stance in economic activity as the domain of manifestation of Grace - takes place), whereas the second passage is a purely formal act, a change of form (as soon as Protestantism is realized as the ascetic acquisitive stance, it can fall off as form).” (For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political factor)

We could read the passage from the second to the third King in the same way: it is not a matter of content anymore - it is obvious that the King cannot live up to his function, but what was a matter of failure of the content in the sir Loxley’s case, becomes the very form of the function of the King for King John.

Lula’s government in Brazil - specially taking in consideration the film which ‘crowns’ it - can also serve as a good example of the effects of this ‘humanization’ of the leader. From the syndicalist who spoke in the name of the People, Lula cannot speak in the name of no one anymore - he doesn’t want to function as the One of the people, which could have many serious consequences for brazilian politics as it is, because he is just one of the people. And his bio-pic comes to attest to this. He is a ‘surviver’, he’s rose from the bottom up to presidency - he is the perfect neo-liberal now, he is the one who can say “I’ve seen it. This is the only way. The natural way.”

Jacques Lacan, in his The other side of psychoanalysis (1969) talks in great details of this passage from the ‘old’ master’s discourse to the ‘new’ one, a discourse that now does not guarantee the law through the figure of a One, but by creating an appearance that its knowledge is immediate and natural. But he warns us:

“the master signifier only appears even more unassailable, precisely in its impossibility. Where is it? How can it be named? How can it be located - other than through its murderous effects, of course.” (Lacan, 1991, pp. 169)

All we are left to witness are the murderous effects of a function that the very supporters of this discourse could swear not to be functional anymore. The King is dead...Long live the King.

We could still wonder why it is that Robin Hood was so focused on broad geo-political matters instead of the everyday heroic acts of Robin (which could also surely be portrayed in an way coherent with the film’s ideology). But then again, not only does the ‘humanization’ find its proper justification - Robin Hood is just a man/ what is happening to the world is also just the natural course of events - but it prevents the film from falling into an uncanny short circuit:

“What if...” - to paraphrase our true hero - in the violent outburst for justice from our all too human protagonist, looting the riches in the night, we saw flashes of the even more human men and women in Haiti, trying to survive today, struggling against the “murderous effects” of the very feudal principles that Robin Hood’s tale so universally naturalized - to the point that an earthquake can be seen as the immediate call-sign for more humanitarian capitalist interference?

Edge of Darkness (2010)


0

Marxian Rating:



"Father can't you see...that you are blind?"

By Gabriel Tupinambá

What is an edge? A border, a limit, a dividing line. An edge, though, differently from any generic limit, tends to refer specially to a border which separates something from some sort of nothingness: You are not the on edge when you are facing a wall, though that is a border and a limit. You are on the edge when you face an abyss.

Many things can function as this bottomless opposition, near which anguish and vertigo are all we experience. In this film, we are on the edge of darkness - so it is not the body that is on the edge, almost falling, but the eyes that are on the brink of not-seeing, of not knowing or believing. The main character, Thomas, also suggests this: St. Thomas, after all, is the saint who had to see it to believe it.

Edge of Darkness (2010) is the film adaptation of a very successful british TV series from the 80’s, by Martin Campbell, who also directed the original version. It tells the story of Thomas Craven (Mel Gibson), a Boston police detective, who seems to have been the target of a killing, but who loses his daughter Emma instead, shot in his place accidentally.

As Thomas investigates the murder, we find out that Emma had discovered that the company she worked for, Northmoor, was not only secretly manufacturing nuclear weapons, but also doing it to foreign specifications so that the dirty bombs would be traced to other nations - She was the true target all along. Revenge is all that is left for Thomas.

Detective stories always dwell within the dialectics of the known and unknown. We start off with a question - usually a body turned into an unknown, asking us ‘Who is the killer?’ - and we move from question to answer, through what we know, towards dark and awful truths.

This is also why detective stories, and mystery tales in general, are such great ideological mechanisms. If you have a question and you look for an answer, and you find one, the question of if it being the right answer will hardly come to mind. If the structure is that of a journey towards discovery, the fact that something is discovered already justifies its veracity.

In Edge of Darkness, the investigation of the murder is followed and intertwined with the discovery of who Thomas’ daughter really was. Besides, every move deeper into the conspiracy also prompts flashbacks of old memories of his daughter, looking up to him, giving detective Craven the strength he needs to keep up the investigation.

In the last chapter of Studies on Hysteria (1895), Freud gives a description of how memories seem to be organized:

“I have described such groupings of similar memories into collections arranged in linear sequences (like a file of documents, a packet, etc.) as constituting ‘themes’. These themes exhibit a second kind of arrangement. Each of them is - I can not express it in any other way - stratified concentrically round the pathogenic nucleus. (...) The deeper we go the more difficult it becomes for the emerging memories to be recognized, till near the nucleus we come upon memories which the patient disavows even in reproducing them. It is this peculiarity of the concentric stratification of the pathogenic psychical material which, as we shall hear, lends to the course of these analyses their characteristic features.”

So the deeper we go towards ‘the nucleus’, the stronger the resistance to recognize ourselves in what we already know. No wonder that one of the classic detective story’s catch phrases is ‘It was him all along’.

But was is there to know here? Things are a bit more complicated in this film. Though the basic thread of the plot is finding out who killed his daughter, when Thomas Craven actually does find out it seems like a minor detail in the narrative. He might not have known who the actual assassin was, but he knew who had sent him for a long time already.

It is through this strange redundancy that we find out what the actual ‘nucleus’ of the discourse is. Neither the thug who killed her, nor Jack Bennet (Danny Huston playing the same role as in The Constant Gardner (2005), the pragmatic president of a company involved in dark conspiracies), were untouchable for Craven - finding out who they were and killing them was never the issue. The issue was an ethical one. How far could he go?

The film quite early on presents us with four different men around which the narrative develops. Through each men’s conversations with Craven, we quickly realize that their position is defined against his - but not only that: they are defined by their notion of what paternity is.

Let’s start with Jack Bennet, Danny Houston’s character. There is a moment in the first dialogue he has with Craven, the first time he appears to us as well, in which he says:

“BENNETT: As a parent I can guess at your pain. I think.

Though I am sure I cannot imagine its full dimensions. (...)What does it feel like?”

Bennet is later on rewarded with a gun on his head for his “polite” question and, by the end of the film, his second question, ‘after what [will you rest]?’ is answered with a bunch of bullets to his already poisoned body.

But before that, the film builds a relation between Bennet’s position regarding paternity and his pragmatic stance - the way he talks and deals with the government, without any worries of approaching the ‘un-official’ side of his business in between the lines, simply stating what should be done in order to solve the problems Craven is creating. Bennet’s position is also mirrored in a couple of other characters, all of which meet more than once to decide how to disperse ‘the heat’ out of the situation, how to turn the story around in the media, and how to dispose of Craven.

What is behind his question to Craven? What does it mean to ask a father who just lost his daughter “What does it feel like?” when one is a father oneself? Bennet makes it very clear that though he is a father, he cannot imagine the ‘full dimensions’ of Craven’s pain. It is not a matter of picturing his child and then imagining his life without him/her. There is something else at stake. What makes the questioning truly perverse is that Bennet already knows that in a fundamental level, Craven doesn’t feel anything. His insight is succinctly described by Jacques Lacan:

“(...) no one can say what is the death of a child - except the father qua father - that is, no conscious being”

(J. Lacan, 1973, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis,)

Bennet is a man that knows there is a split between the father and the man. There are aspects of the function of the father that the man who fills the function cannot reach. It is because he knows of this gap, of this abyss which “no conscious being” can cross, that he can expose Craven to its edge.

Since this unfathomable dimension of the father is not within the subject’s conscious grasp, it is also the source of an irreducible lack, one which prompts the subject to try and fill it, causes the subject to desire. Bennet’s knowledge of this dimension is also the source of his immorality: instead of trying to fill the impossible function of paternity, he simply disavows it, not worrying about the moral consequences of his position - after all, he is not the father, he shouldn’t have to answer to the impossible responsibility of one.

Craven is thus defined in opposition to Bennet as the man who feels morally responsible for the consequences of being the support of his daughter’s desire. And as we learn with the story’s developments, his daughter’s sense of moral duty was precisely what she inherited from him.

Once Craven starts unveiling the conspiracy, the branches of the government that are involved with the whole thing (Senators, National Defense people etc) decide to hire a ‘consultant’ to assess the situation and, if needed, get rid of the detective: Mr. Jedburgh.

Mr. Jedburgh defines his job as being the guy who doesn’t allow us to ‘connect A to B’. Like most characters who are supposed to transit between the ideological surface and its inner-workings (‘A’ and ‘B’), Jedburgh is a very refined man (like Armin Mueller-Stahl in The International, for example) who does the dirty work, but at the same time keeps a moral sense of what is right.

When he first meets Craven, and is very impressed with the man’s commitment to finding the killer of his daughter, he calls himself Diogenes, “the one who went around with the lamp, looking for an honest man”.

But Jedburgh has a secret of his own, he is dying of cancer. He knows he won’t be around for much longer. And when he meets Craven, he decides not to kill him right away, and just see how far the detective is willing to go. When they meet for the second time, him and Craven have the following conversation:

“CRAVEN: So what’s that like...being no one in particular?

JEDBURGH: I don’t know what it means to have lost a child.

But I know what it means never to have had one.

If Bennet is the man who disavows his position as a father and its consequences (‘father’ understood here in the broad sense of guaranteeing the space for ethics and for desire), Jedburgh seems to be a man defined by the impossibility of fatherhood.

He’s comparison between having lost a child and not having one is an answer to Craven’s question regarding what it was like “being no one in particular” - what it was like not being defined by one singular idea. His answer is that he is defined by the very unfathomable function he does not fill. He identifies with Craven precisely because he, like Bennet, knows there is a gap between man and father, and he defines himself by the very contradiction of the two, by this uncertain core of fatherhood. He is not a father, but exactly because of it, he feels responsible for an aspect of fatherhood most man turn away from. Pater semper incertus est.

Craven looks back at Jedburgh from the supplementary position. He is defined by being all the father he can be - and this circumscribes the father he cannot be, ‘the nucleus’ of the film’s discourse, so to speak.

This aspect becomes even more evident when compared to yet a fourth man, Bill Whitehouse. Bill is Thomas Craven’s friend in the police department.

By the time Craven knows what is going on, things are not looking good for him - he just found out that his daughter was poisoned with radioactive milk and it seems like he has just been poisoned himself. When he gets back home, after just outsmarting two of Bennet’s security guards who had been following him, he meets his friend Bill, who sold him out to the bad guys. They talk:

“WHITEHOUSE: I got kids Tommy.

CRAVEN: I don't.

WHITEHOUSE: And even if you did, right? Even if you did?

CRAVEN: ... Even if I did.”

Bill Whitehouse is the man who identifies totally with his function as a father. But how is that possible? The answer to that comes through his sad acknowledgment of Craven’s position - “Even if you did, right?” - Bill can pretend being a father is being a man who ‘has children’ as long as Craven keeps the difference between the two open. He knows very well, but...

At this moment, in a strange way, Bill, the man who was ‘just a father’ and Bennet, the father who was ‘just a man’, meet in their perverse disavowal of what fatherhood is.

A bit later on, after Bennet was killed by Craven - who is now on his deathbed at a hospital, dying from the radioactive poisoning - Jedburgh meets with the Senator who was responsible for the law which authorized Northmoor to go on with the secret armament testing and with three other government figures.

They are discussing how the whole situation will appear in the media, and they can’t decide the best solution. Jedburgh interrupts them and describes a full strategy, explaining that the whole thing should look like the Senator (who had met Thomas Craven at a certain point) had escaped from Craven’s mad attempt at killing him. It’s a perfect plan. Jedburgh knows his métier. But after this display of clarity about the system inner-workings, he stands up and shoots all of them. And before his turn comes up, the Senator gets up in fright and says “I’m a United States Senator.” To what Jedburgh calmly answers: “By what standards?” and then shoots him.

But as he goes for the door, one of the Senator’s guards stops him. The young insecure police officer just stands there, scared as hell, holding his gun, staring at the armed man who just shot four of the most powerful people in the country. In the tension of the two facing guns, Jedburgh breaks the silence and asks the policeman if he has a family. The man nods positively. Jedburgh holds his gun aside, like a gentleman refusing fire in a duel, and the young man takes him down.

After this necessary detour - looking at the different characters based on the same ‘theme’ that appear throughout the film - we can finally determinate with some precision what is this nucleus around which these characters organize themselves - for what is paternity in the film's vocabulary if not the signifier of any ethical stance?

In his Traumdeutung (1900), Freud tells of a man who lost his son. The father was watching the dead body of his son when he fell asleep and had a dream. Outside of his dream, a candle had fallen from the bed side table and the bed sheet as well as his dead son’s arm caught on fire. Inside his dream, the man saw himself standing in a room where his son suddenly appeared and told him “Father, I am burning”. And then asked him “Can’t you see it?”. The father woke up and put the fire out.

Freud then wonders what happened: If the actual incident was repeated inside the dream, it means that the father’s mind picked up on what was happening. But still he didn’t wake up. He kept on sleeping. But then, what did wake him up? Freud’s answer could only be one: the question “Can’t you see it?”.

In the same way the father couldn’t wake up to the horrible truth that his son was on fire, now he also couldn’t keep on dreaming - it would mean facing a dark and awful truth, an even more traumatic “waking up” to the horrifying answer to the son's question. He wakes up to reality in order to keep on sleeping on another register. He wakes up in order to avoid the answer that he cannot see it. The place from which he should be watching has no eyes. He cannot speak from that position.

Through his analysis of this dream, Freud drew a very brilliant definition of this edge we’ve been speaking about. It is a border between two realms, but if you cross it, it disappears. When on the edge, to move out of the dream into reality is simply to turn away and return.

The Edge of Darkness is exemplary because it functions both as a father’s desperate fantasy, his “waking up” to the reality of “facts” as well as a mapping many different positions towards the abyss of an impossible question - “Can you answer from the place of an Ideal?”. These same positions, when undressed from their family-drama semblance, are the very stuff of any ethical commitment.

Isn’t Bill the man who confuses the Idea with his own shortcomings as a man? And Bennet the one who takes his personal failures as a proof that the Idea is not worth it? Isn’t Craven the man who only trusts the Idea insofar as it is justified pathologically in reality? The definite confirmation of this comes when, faced with the killer of his daughter (whom he knows committed many other terrible crimes) Craven stops for a moment, holding the guy down, and asks him to repeatedly scream his [Craven’s] name, so he can compare it to the scream that accompanied the murder shots. At first it seems like he wants a confirmation of the murderer, but the repetition of his demand points towards a confirmation of him as a father. That’s what he needs. The answer to his demand is ‘Craven!’, but the question might just be...‘Who’s your daddy?’

And finally, wasn’t Jedburgh the one who, by giving up his body for the sake of “a standard”, somehow understood that the only possible answer from the place of the Ideal comes from the commitment of the son ?

His dead body is not like the dead body of the main hero - who in the end of the movie walks out of the hospital happily reconnected to his daughter, in spirit. The dead Hero is a dead father. With him the Idea goes to another world, it is stuck to him. But the dead Jedburgh is a dead son. In his death something lives on. Thomas Carven died in the name of his child. But Jedburgh died in the name of the father.

The moral question of the film - “Can you go to the end for justice?” - which shines a light into the darkness of the things the father didn’t know, pushing him forward and deeper into the mystery, serves as a cover up for the much darker insight that he cannot know: if you go to the end and cross the edge, you lose the spectral appearance of the abyss itself. It is Jedburgh, who stopping at the edge when faced with a shot he could not take, who stills keeps the reference to an Ideal alive.

Still, if the edge of paternity coincides with the edge of the ethical act, it is not in the subject’s death that the Ideal should be sustained, for even if Jedburgh’s act costs him only his own body and not someone else’s, it is still a death that ‘warns’ us to the danger of ‘going too far’ so that death is the only ethical way out.

The true edge - the abyss which Hollywood keeps away with fierce disavowal - is defined by the clear impossibility of re-imagining this film in a way that the Ideal wouldn’t be something to die for, but to live by.

24 (2001) & Lie to Me (2009)


1


Marxian Rating:




The two human faces of capitalism
by Martín López

The legitimacy of the debate over justifying torture is a common place in the post 9/11 political thought. Specifically, it is said, torture may be justified in the (oh, so trite) ticking time bomb scenario. In these situations, we are told, good guys work in a time trial against the clock finding and interrogating prisoners accused of having information that may prevent terrorist attacks. The kind of information that should be obtained somehow to, of course, save millions of lives. (Say it again: Save millions of lives. Now repeat it in front of the mirror: Save millions of lives...)

We know this is nothing new. In the CIA, for example, torture and clandestine imprisonment have been de facto methods of interrogation in the last decades. The news is that today torture is pretended to be a legitimate matter of public debate. Anything can be said, as long as the ticking bomb scenario is not questioned. Moreover, there's a second untouchable hypothesis: only unlawful combatants are the guarantors of the truth. Only they know what is really going on; so they have to talk, whether you like it or not. Those who are identified as unlawful combatants are the law beyond the law itself (in the same way "undead" means monstrously alive).

As Slavoj Žižek warned us in 2002:

[…] Every authentic liberal should see these debates, these calls to ‘keep an open mind’, as a sign that the terrorists are winning. And, in a way, essays like Alter’s, which do not openly advocate torture, but just introduce it as a legitimate topic of debate, are even more dangerous than explicit endorsements. At this moment at least, explicitly endorsing it would be rejected as too shocking, but the mere introduction of torture as a legitimate topic allows us to court the idea while retaining a clear conscience. (‘Of course I am against torture, but who is hurt if we just discuss it?’) Admitting torture as a topic of debate changes the entire field, while outright advocacy remains merely idiosyncratic. The idea that, once we let the genie out of the bottle, torture can be kept within ‘reasonable’ bounds, is the worst liberal illusion, if only because the ‘ticking clock’ example is deceptive: in the vast majority of cases torture is not done in order to resolve a ‘ticking clock’ situation, but for quite different reasons (to punish an enemy or to break him down psychologically, to terrorise a population etc). Any consistent ethical stance has to reject such pragmatic-utilitarian reasoning. Here’s a simple thought experiment: imagine an Arab newspaper arguing the case for torturing American prisoners; think of the explosion of comments about fundamentalist barbarism and disrespect for human rights that would cause.


Killing me softly

The public opinion is divided in two apparently opposite blocks. The conservative side explicitly justifies torture based on a simplistic costs-benefit analysis by which a couple of ethical principles can be discarded when millions of lives need (don't forget) to be saved. Since the danger is imminent, it's just a matter of necessity. The beneficial effects are higher (i.e. saving lives) so it's OK to put aside a couple of elementary rights. The problem comes when the exception is the rule.

On the other hand, we have the weak and symbiotic liberal resistance, that condemns torture in name of human rights... but at the same time concedes some extreme measures need to be taken, such as invasive methods of interrogation. Always, of course, with majority consensus and parliamentary support. They condemn torture according to democratic principles, but recognize that in some extreme situations, it would be valid to tighten the screws on the usual suspects. In short: the liberal response is simply the implementation of torture with a human face.

The million dollar (or million lives) question is: Under what conditions can we know for certain that torturing a prisoner can save millions of innocent people? This situation always belongs to the realm of the imaginary, because it presupposes a series of future developments that, even before happening, retroactively justify the present violence. However it has serious consequences when taken seriously: thousands of innocent people are tortured in order to save the few who really deserved to be blamed.

Stop whining, it's time to act

24 is the emblematic case of the first answer to our tricky question. Is it legitimate to torture to save the lives of millions? 24 doesn't just say Yes; the very literary techniques are put together in such a way that make us think there's no other way. It's the perfect fantasy. The bomb is always ticking, we have 24 hours, there's no time, we're under attack, everything is a threat, we've already lost our innocence, it's time to act. Now. We have to cross the thin red line between Good and Evil (the Good is always defined in terms of avoiding the Evil, only the Evil has an authentic ontological substance). The universalization of corruption serves as a neutralization of the emergence of the good. Since everything is corrupted, the appearance of an “ethical” character is justified simply by being different from evil. No one asks the brechtian question: “Good, yes. But for whom?”

Things are never easy. When torture begins a life will be ruined. But don't misunderstand it: It's not the life of the tortured, but that of the torturer. Torturing leads to a road with no return... basically if you are the torturer. In 24, the hero is the torturer, the silent savior who voluntarily sacrifices himself (in the sense of abandoning his humanitarian principles) in order to obtain the most valuable treasure, the most precious thing ever: the information that will (guess what) save millions of lives. And of course, only the most obscure suspects have that information. The utopia here is that of the suppression of justice, the conception of a world in which justice is not needed to sustain the existing order.

Don't miss the seventh season! At a first glance, the main themes might scandalize the average republican: agent Jack Bauer is agonizing because he was contaminated with a biological weapon. The doctors decide to try a controversial stem cell treatment to save his life! While Bauer is dying at the hospital, he refuses to meet his daughter. Instead, he prefers to meet and Arab who he had mistreated... and pray with him! He is on his deathbed, cleansing from his sins on a multicultural prayer, but not yet prepared to say goodbye to his own daughter. Do not get it wrong: There's nothing more important than redemption. That's the tragic aspect of our hero. He sacrifices himself... by sacrificing other threatening lives. He sacrificed his soul to save us... while sacrificing other lives. Now, when his life comes to an end, is time to save his soul. Let me put it in other words: What is at stake here is not the biological life of our hero, but his ethical integrity. It's too late for Mary Magdalenes. He has to put emotions aside in the name of a bigger purpose. That's Jack Bauer's ultimate ethical act. He has to dehumanize himself in order to save humanity.

In these obamian times, conservatives should not be afraid of it: In 24, the president is a woman. A woman that sends her own daughter to jail because she succumbed to the temptation of taking justice into her own hands. The mother, and president, can not allow it. She, as a heroin, had to put aside her emotions and betray her daughter. And right after that, without even taking a breath, the president resumed the bigger task: save the world. Another hero who sacrifices for us. Another true patriot that momentarily abandons his humanity (also known as inconvenient weakness) to save us. Once again, it is necessary to dehumanize ourselves in order to save humanity.

After 11-S, Bush's dreams of military intervention in the middle east had the chance to become real. The fantasy came true. Today it's time to give them a new (less ugly) human face. Only systematic torture can be accepted. We have to trust the authorities. They will tell us who the bad guys are. They will tell us when we are in danger. They can guarantee that the “right thing” is done even when the system which sets the right and wrongs cannot go through with it because of (theoretically) empirical or bureaucratic obstacles. So we don't need philosophy; we need more plastic surgeons.

Lie to me: hide your tics

On the other side of this very same coin, we have the liberal counterpart. The commercial motto says it all: “Truth is written all over your faces”. It's not race, sex, or class what determines us (nor history, nor culture, nor thought): It's universal Gestures: involuntary tics, facial expressions, voice waveforms, etc. Tics are studied as an adaptive strategy of human species favored by natural selection. Tics do not depend on culture: they are inscribed in the laws of nature. We -as materialists- should not be afraid of that thesis. It can be ultimately valid. The danger is a much more subtle one: biological determinations (hypothetical or empirically proven) are sometimes used as an excuse to naturalize social antagonism. So when the bomb is ticking, we should not torture the usual suspects: we should read their criminal faces instead.

We can obtain the most valuable information to save (millions of) lives by means of lie detection methods based on applied psychology. Truth is there, hiding in the involuntary expressions of the interviewees. The enlightened Mr. Lightman is a kind of alter ego of evolutionary psychologist Paul Ekman, a pioneer in the study of human facial expressions and body language. Ekman is a modern version of Lombroso, that nineteenth-century Italian criminologist who held that crime was an innate tendency in some people. Lombroso believed it was enough to observe certain physical features such as skull shape in order to detect criminal behaviour. Ekman's theory, as we now, is only based in gestures. There are universal gestures, inherited from our evolutionary ancestors. And through the systematic study of these gestures it is possible to catch the criminals.

Mr. Lightman, the CEO of The Lightman Group, works closely with the FBI to resolve extremely complex cases in which the expert eye's will follow the clues that the players will unwittingly reveal through "microexpressions" (small gestures, fleeting as a blink of an eye, barely perceptible windows through which we can see the most obscure motivations).

Mastering the art of reading the truth written all over the faces of the usual suspects is not easy. It's not actually an art, but an applied science. Methods can be very invasive: you might need to listen to private conversations, analyze videos (which are not always recorded with the consent of the interviewee), learn manipulation techniques, become an expert in social engineering, etc. You will usually have to lie in order to discover the liar. And it's not only a question of interviewing the suspect. Also their families may have to be interrogated. You will have to infiltrate the whole social environment of the suspect. It is not only a question of scientific research. It is also necessary to stage the perfect scenario to discover the liar.

Torture is a primitive method for multicultural liberals and human rights watchers. You can obtain the same results through more refined and democratic ways. Brute force has a human face too. It doesn't mean that you have to hurt the enemies of freedom. The problem is not the content but the form. Do not inflict pain: Invade, deceive, betray, lie, manipulate, but do not touch your enemies, don't hurt them. They have bodies, so they happen to be humans too. If violence cannot be avoided, it has to be “neutrally” organized and dosed. Here's the moralistic aftermath: all physical violence is dehumanizing.

Lie to Me also flirts with some kind of postmodern revisionism; a parallel version of history in which civil rights are reduced to body rights. Like if bombing, slaughtering and torturing would not have been necessary to achieve the very same goals: find Bin Laden, Defeat Al Qaeda, win the war on terror, save (millions of) lives who are there just to be saved. Lives that are just waiting there for us to save them. The principles that refer to "a million people's lives" as a concrete notion are not questioned: It's the bodycount notion of humanity.

In the last chapter of his first season, Lie to Me also activates the ticking time bomb, though in its liberal democratic turn. A bomb explodes in a bus, then another bomb explodes in a shopping mall. We have to stop the third bomb. The FBI immediately contacts our heroes (actually their hire them, remember they are a private company). There's a wonderfully symptomatic scene in which Dr Lightman interrupts a torture session conducted by national security institutions (a prisoner is being forced to confess). Lightman's point is very clear: Torture is inelegant, we can use a more persuasive method. What a declaration of principles!

Later on, it is revealed that a former FBI agent has illegally installed microphones in a mosque to listen to conversations between Muslim suspects. We are told that the retired agent belonged to the “previous administration”, that is to say, Bush's bygone era. Dr. Lightman blackmails the FBI agent and forces him to provide the hidden tapes. It is OK to blackmail the bad guy: he is a fanatical conservative, a mercenary who acted against the law, secretly hoping the government will someday summon him to save the world. Dr. Lightman, on the contrary, is a man of science, a liberal with great humanitarian commitment. But it was Lightman who finally made use of those illegal tapes. It was through those tapes that eventually the third attack could be prevented. Conservatives, those pragmatic barbarians, are always called to do the dirty work. Liberals always question their methods... but at the same time rely on the results obtained by those methods. Thank god the tapes existed! Guess what: they were used to save the biological life of thousands of people.

The ideological fantasy of the solitary hero strikes again. We must put aside our human condition, we have to act like animals. And act like animals implies -a priori- that the rest of the human beings should be treated like animals. Only the biological life is sacred: We need to protect those weak lives, those potential victims that need to be saved. And who will be the ones? It cannot be just anybody. Ir requires a special talent, and we know talent comes with sacrifice. That's what Mr Lightman says to his disciple in a moment of weakness. What makes you think you talent belongs only to you? Rethorical answer: Your talent belongs to humanity, sacrifice yourself in the name of humanity.

There's something else in this fantasy: The passive, almost non-confrontational way by which the suspects accept to be interrogated. Guantanamos are no longer needed, right? We are allowed to fear the solitary savior, but not to question him. The only thing we can do to escape this “justice” is fooling the hero at his own game. Being even less human than he is.

So what is the political message conveyed in Lie to Me? What are their ideological symptoms? What involuntary movements can we detect in its narrative structure, in the interstices of the story, in its tics? What is the truth written over the face of its heroe? Does the obamian human face of capitalism have tics as well?